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ESSAYS
COMPETING IN GLOBAL PRODUCT
INNOVATION: IS ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
NECESSARY?
George J. Alexandert
One hears many cries that antitrust should be curtailed in the
interest of improving United States competitiveness. There can be
no doubt that the country's economic position has been slipping for
a considerable time. Calls for change are always viewed more seri-
ously when there is agreement that the situation is deteriorating.
This article is an essay of the author's reactions to the revisionists.
It opines that antitrust generally functions well and that other ad-
justments ought to be considered before further changes are made
to it.
Antitrust is truly an American contribution to world law.
Although the concept of restraint of trade existed in England before
the Sherman Act,1 the shape of modem law comes from that act.
As the United States prospered, it became an increasingly demand-
ing proponent of its utility. Its message was influential. Antitrust
now appears in the national laws of most free market countries.2 It
is prominent in the European Community where it provides a sec-
ond layer over the national laws on the same subject.3 Even Japan, a
country that has made only modest use of its law, has recently ap-
peared more interested in its enforcement.4
Unfortunately, the United States has fallen on harder times in
its international trade. In a number of industries in which Ameri-
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1. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
2. See generally J. VON KALINOWSK, WORLD LAW OF COMPE1TON (1987).
3. Treaty of Rome (1962), §§ 85-86, Regulation 17, at 2 Common Market Reporter
§ 2400.
4. Apple Japan and Canon Face Antitrust Probe, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1989, at A6, col. 3.
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can firms controlled, products from other countries now
predominate. With the changes that flow from subordination, the
pressures to moderate antitrust impact have grown.
Pressures for change come from opposite ends of the economic
and political spectrums. On the one hand there are some in busi-
ness who feel that what they lack is the ability to cooperate with
other U.S. firms to tackle foreign competitors. They seek relief
from antitrust restrictions on size and on joint ventures.5
Others, especially in high tech fields, focus on the limited ad-
vantage they achieve from innovation. Even given patent and copy-
right protection, they find their ideas reproduced abroad, if not
domestically, in short time. They tend to press for relief for cooper-
ative development and production groups strong enough to fend off
the imitators.'
Labor leaders press for protection from lower cost foreign
goods. They tend to focus on import duties and restrictions as
means for accomplishing their objectives.7
All of such proposals have in common a belief that free market
forces are inadequate or inappropriate to solve the country's
problems. Although America urged the rest of the world to rely on
its economic philosophy when it was the leading economic force in
the world, it is seen as now considering at least partial recantation.
This essay will attempt an evaluation of the desirability of
modifying the antitrust laws in order to facilitate greater innova-
tion. Some change has already taken place and further change is
being proposed. The essay will also discuss whether other measures
might be useful to promote innovation.
American products have lost their appeal in the world, and in-
deed, in the United States over the last several decades. The Japa-
nese and others have captured much of the world market in
automobiles.' American manufactured cars have even lost a sub-
stantial share of the U.S. market. 9 Electronics manufacturing has
largely moved to Asia." While the United States pioneered in com-
puter development, it is fighting to retain that market.1 Chip man-
5. Shenenfield, Export Joint Ventures, 54 ANTrTRUST L.J. 1039 (1985).
6. Hoffman, Marcou & Murray, Commercial Piracy ofIntellectual Property, 71 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 556 (1989).
7. Note, An Analysis of the Conflicts Between Congressional Import Quotas and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 734, 744 (1986).
8. Car Output Up in Japan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1989, at D3, col. 3.
9. Vehicle Sales Dropped 19% In Late June, N.Y. Times, Jul. 6, 1989, at DI, col. 6.
10. 2 Studies Show Big Drops In U.S. Share of Electronics, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1989, at
Dl, col 1.
11. Markoff, Supercomputers Worry US .... N.Y. Times, May 1, 1989, at D1, col. 4.
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ufacture is slipping. 2 Software is being produced - sometimes
simply copied - abroad.' 3 Hardware is also coming in from the
orient.14
It is discomforting for a country to be a second-rate economic
power even if it has never experienced greater success. Far worse is
to have been the preeminent power in the world at the middle of the
century and to be falling, seemingly inexorably, into that status.
Politically, it is expedient not to admit reality and to blame the
problems which exist on external factors.
It would be easier to adopt new protectionist policies had the
United States not been the prime advocate of free markets as a
world economic solution.' 5 Especially troublesome, at the moment,
is the fact that the planned economies which seemed our major
trade opponents, have themselves so largely been persuaded of the
utility of free markets and have begun shedding failed planning as a
national policy.' 6
In the main, the Reagan administration pressed free market
values. During its eight years, internal antitrust was stripped of
most of its focus on values other than economic efficiency. The pe-
riod provides a sharp contrast with the remainder of post World
War II antitrust. In the prior twenty-plus years, concern about the
social consequences of concentration of economic power was an im-
portant factor in antitrust.'7 Although size was never admitted to
be itself a violation of law, the principal method of acquiring size,
merger, was greatly restricted and monopoly size was condemned
unless it was inevitable.' 8 As recently as the Von's Grocery
merger, 19 Justice Stewart noted that, in anti-merger cases, "The
sole consistency that I can find is that ... the Government always
wins."20 Economic pluralism was pursued aggressively despite a
12. The Chip Industry Is Sliding Again, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1989, at D1, col. 3.
13. Farnsworth, China Called Top Copyright Pirate, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1989, at D7,
col. 4.
14. See Miller, Technology: Devices Shows Changes As They Are Made in Fax, Wall St.
J., Jun. 5, 1989, at B1, col. 1. See also Schlesinger, Zen and the Art ofAuto Sales, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 13, 1989, at B1, col. 3.
15. Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development Reality or
Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831, 833 (1987). See also Soviet Call to West: Money for Rebuilding,
N.Y. Times, Oct, 29, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
16. Gamble & Killheffer, The Enemies of United States' Trade Competitiveness: A Law-
yer's Perspective, 6 DEL. LAW. 7 (Winter 1988).
17. See Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and
Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1020 (1987).
18. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 [hereinafter Alcoa].
19. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
20. Id. at 301.
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recognition that it might lead to inefficiency and, consequently, in-
creased costs for consumers.21 The benefits to be realized included
lessening of political power by major corporations, presumably in
some proportion to their reduced capital base, and increased busi-
ness opportunity for relatively small entrepreneurs.22
In the following years, antitrust policy shifted to an equally
polar, but opposite position. Led by Chicago school economists, the
government almost totally abandoned its focus on the political con-
sequences of business size to pursue economic efficiency. 23 Concern
about abuses of economic power were subordinated to allowing
firms to seek to solidify their positions. So long as firms did not
obtain enough market power to control prices, mergers were freely
approved. Firms were assumed to be the best judge of efficiency in
making merger decisions. The market place was seen as the best
"regulator" punishing incorrect decisions and rewarding those pru-
dently accomplished. Much governmental regulation of business
was dropped in favor of business competition in the industry.
Merger mania replaced an equally frantic period of merger
prohibition.24
Among other things, the shift in policy was supposed to en-
hance American competitiveness in the world market. American
competitiveness had slipped to its lowest ebb since World War II.
Causation is difficult to fix in these matters. It can be argued that
the loss of market position was a product of the prior period of
world wide growth strangulation or of the less competitive stance of
the now larger companies. It is quite likely, however, that the loss
of market position is more a product of the increased growth and
sophistication of the other developed and developing countries.
In addition, many in Congress are urging that tariff barriers be
raised and that further efforts be made to insure a better balance
between exports and imports.25 Whether these take the form of ex-
21. "Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing considera-
tions in favor of decentralization." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344
(1962).
22. "Throughout the history of... [the antitrust acts] it has been constantly assumed
that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of
possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with
each other." Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
23. Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1219, 1221
(1988).
24. Austin, Antitrust Reaction to the Merger Wave: The Revolution v. the Counterrevo-
lution, 66 N.C.L. REv. 931, 933 (1988).
25. Note, supra note 7, at 744.
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port quotas for our trading partners or of import quotas for our
products, such measures are, of course, the antithesis of free market
forces. They result in distortions in supply which raise the price of
products. They certainly raise the extent of governmental market
planning.
The slipping world position of the United States presented an
interesting dilemma to the administration. President Reagan's pub-
lic positions were always cast in terms of free market principles.
Yet, his administration proposed a number of laws which moder-
ated antitrust even in instances in which classic restraints of trade
might take place. Chief among them were the National Coopera-
tive Research Act of 198426 and the Export Trading Company Act
of 1982.27 The former eased antitrust concerns for companies en-
gaged in research and development. The latter did the same for
associations engaged in export.
While it is not clear how or even whether President Bush will
change the executive department's approach to antitrust,28 several
proposals are being considered which would further moderate anti-
trust in international transactions. So far, the administration has
expressed interest and ambivalence.29 As of this writing, it has not
yet taken a position on the proposals in Congress which would con-
tinue the Reagan program.
There are two major approaches to the new proposals. One
type, modelled on the ETCA,30 provides for reporting to govern-
ment, approval and resultant antitrust immunity. The other type,
modelled on the NCRA,3 1 does not involve governmental review.
It reduces antitrust exposure by dropping treble damages and insti-
tuting the rule of reason as the review standard.
In apparent recognition of the potential anticompetitive effect
of blanket exemptions, both approaches use either the courts or ad-
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988) hereinafter NCRA].
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1988) [hereinafter ETCA].
28. Assistant Attorney General Rill recently indicated that antitrust enforcement
would have an increasingly prominent role in the Department's work, J. Rill, Antitrust and
International Competitiveness in the 1990's, Remarks before the Annual Meeting of the Sec-
tion of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association 3 (Aug. 7, 1989), but later in the same
speech opined that he thought that there primarily was a need for better communication with
the public concerning the Department's work. Rill stated "there may be a need for further
clarification of the antitrust laws applicable to joint ventures, particularly joint production
ventures." Id. at 9.
29. See Concerning Joint Production Ventures, testimony of Michael Boudin before the
Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, May 17, 1989.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1988).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988).
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ministrative agencies to sort out anticompetitive collaboration.
Since prior law only prohibited anticompetitive collaboration, these
acts would be redundant if the law were perfectly applied. Both
approaches are obvious attempts to lower the risk of antitrust error
for U.S. sellers by making it easer to avoid unfavorable results.
These approaches, consequently, are either useless or inhibit
antitrust.
The Export Trading Company Act has had some impact on
the creation of exporting associations. As of the middle of 1989,
one hundred-two export trade certificates had been issued. Both of
the administration agencies involved in granting the certificates,
Commerce and Justice, believe the act is working well.32
The Cooperative Research Act is also apparently having an im-
pact. One hundred twenty-five notifications had been filed in the
same period.33 Further, the act may well have persuaded some
companies to proceed with cooperative research and development
without filing.
Following the urging of the prior administration and as a result
of new appointments to the Supreme Court, the Court has shifted
toward an efficiency based approach to antitrust. Actions which
were considered per se violations of law, are now governed by the
rule of reason.3" The rule of reason generally allows justification of
actions when they make transactions more efficient.35 Private treble
damage actions have, on a variety of grounds, been diminished. 6
The major premise of proposals which would allow greater co-
operation among U.S. producers is that the resultant size would
make American competition more effective in international mar-
kets. Larger aggregations of assets, it is argued, are needed to deal
efficiently with international markets.3 7
Why would more concentrated American companies (or joint
ventures) compete more effectively in world markets? If less frag-
mented markets are more efficient, why not amend domestic law to
accomplish the same results? The fact that the Clayton Act, with
its anti-merger provision, has not been modified to lessen its impact
32. See Boudin, supra note 28, at 12.
33. Id. at 9.
34. Eg., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co,, 472
U.S. 284 (1985); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); United States
v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
35. "Mhat there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard; that departure
from that standard must be justified by demonstrable economic effect .... Business Elects.
Corp. v. Sharp Elects. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (1988).
36. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
37. Shenenfield, supra note 5.
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since its passage in 1914 indicates that there is no such consensus.'!
The conventional explanation for requiring different conditions in
overseas trade is it that the American market is open and that the
markets abroad are protected by national policies.3 9
There are policies in other countries which block free trade.
Chief among them are tariff barriers which keep U.S. trade from
entering.' Inspection and standard setting have a similar effect.4 '
Government subsidy to industry which leads to exports also has a
significant effect.42
Also important is the concern that foreign goods not drive out
both actual and potential competition.43 Were they able to do so,
sellers of those products could then exploit their position by charg-
ing higher prices or allowing their product to deteriorate.
To some extent, adjustments to permissible size under antitrust
laws is being accomplished by considering the world to be the ap-
propriate geographic market.' For all the reasons that apply to
domestic law, market definition should reflect the actual range of
alternatives available to sellers. Even a national monopoly need not
offend the law if the product is brought under effective competition,
in the foreign markets and at home, by equally well established
competitors of sufficient size and number. U.S. antitrust has histor-
ically considered the national boundaries as the maximum geo-
graphic market for products.45 The possible competition of imports
has been disregarded. Judge Hand, in the Alcoa case," pointed out
that to do otherwise presented difficult problems.47 Transportation
costs may make foreign competition inadequate to force a competi-
tive price in the domestic market. That problem, however, is not
new to antitrust. It forms part of the analysis of the appropriate
38. But see infra note 54.
39. See Donlan, Not So Free Trade: U.S. Preaches What It Doesn't Always Practice,
Barron's, Jun. 27, 1988, at 70.
40. See Aim & Tanakadate, Is Japan Really Opening the Door to Trade?, U.S. News and
World Rep., Aug. 12, 1985, at 24. See also Walls, Protectionism and Trade Barriers, Dep't St.
Bull., Jan. 1988, at 29.
41. See Archbold, Pre-Shipment Inspections Pose Rising Threat to Exports, Cashflow,
May 1987, at 57.
42. Fong & Walker, International High-Technology Joint Venturer. An Antitrust and
Antidumping Analysis, 7 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 57 (1989).
43. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964).
44. L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 70 (Hornbook Series 1977).
45. Id. at 68.
46. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
47. He reasoned that "within the limits afforded by the tariff and the cost of transporta-
tion, 'Alcoa' was free to raise its prices as it chose... ." Id. at 426.
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geographic market.48
Tariffs are another matter. They should logically be a factor in
market definition. If tariffs impose significant entry barriers (as
they often do) the market should remain domestic.49 Arrangements
which are approved because of the existence of a world wide market
should be reevaluated when new tariffs are imposed.50 In other
words, an American company should not be allowed an excessive
position in the domestic market on the grounds of world competi-
tion if that competition cannot reach domestic markets without
tariff distortion. If an industry believes it would be competitive in
the world market if it were allowed to amalgamate its resources
(either by merger or joint production venture) it should bear the
burden of obtaining an end to tariff protection so that its thesis can
be put to a market test.
In fact, domestic antitrust principles are generally an excellent
guide in international application. As a start, companies that have
benefitted from the more permissive attitude toward mergers and
vertically imposed restraints at home should not be heard to com-
plain against comparable arrangements by their foreign competi-
tors. Consistency, however, still appears to be an often despised
virtue. There have been vocal complaints 51 against tying and exclu-
sive dealing arrangements despite the fact that the former is clearly
governed by rule of reason analysis52 and the latter is so circum-
scribed as a per se offense that it might as well be.5" Similarly, com-
panies have complained about mergers which include foreign
competitors.54 Having persuaded U.S. enforcers that merger law
48. "While the relevant competitive market is not ordinarily susceptible to 'metes and
bounds' definition, cf. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611, it is of
course the area in which respondents and the other 700 producers effectively compete."
Tampa Elect. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 331-32 (1961).
49. It seems that the Justice Department is at best equivocal on that point. In the U.S.
Department of Justice Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 54 ANTrTRusT &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) S1 (June 9, 1988) [hereinafter Antitrust Guidelines], the Depart-
ment indicated that "[foreign competitors would not be excluded from the relevant market
solely because their sales in the United States are subject to quotas or VERs [voluntary export
restraints]. That is because it is difficult to assess the effectiveness and longevity of such
restraints .... " Id. at S18. Later it did note that it would consider the actual impact of the
restraint and acknowledged that such quotas or VER might actually assist cartel pricing. Id.
50. But see Remarks of Charles F. Rule before the Antitrust Law Section Annual Meet-
ing of the New York State Bar Assoc., Jan. 27, 1988, at 4-5.
51. Remarks of Charles F. Rule before the Antitrust Law Section of the New York
State Bar Assoc., Jan. 12, 1988, at 6.
52. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
53. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26 (1984).
54. Davidow, Special Antitrust Issues Raised by International Joint Ventures, 54 ANTr-
TRusT L.J. 1031 (1985).
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should protect competition without necessarily trying to protect
small business competitors also, some now urge that it protect U.S.
companies from the competition of foreigners. The Reagan admin-
istration proposed giving the President authority to allow unlimited
mergers and acquisitions in an import affected industry "unless
there is a significant probability that such merger or acquisition
would substantially increase the ability of the resulting firm to
maintain prices above competitive levels in such market for a signif-
icant period of time" (emphasis added).55 Commerce Secretary Bal-
drige went a step farther and proposed outright repeal of Section 7
of the Clayton Act, the provision of antitrust law which deals with
mergers.56
The prescription of use of domestic principles with respect to
mergers requires a caveat because the Justice Department has not
chosen to bring many to the Supreme Court. The older, and never
expressly overruled, cases hold that efficiencies are not necessarily
relevant in deciding whether a merger violates the law.57 It seems
likely that the present Court would disregard that principle. At
least in industries competing in the world market, the Court cer-
tainly should." Rather than obstruct mergers and joint ventures
between U.S. and foreign manufacturers when they are based in cre-
ating efficiencies and when they don't threaten competitive pricing,
the United States should encourage and support them.59
A far more difficult problem attends U.S. antidumping legisla-
tion.' ° In the first place, the law is broad and there are proposals to
make it broader. One suggestion is to have the law apply to any
product that has a "dumped" component. 61 Another is to provide a
private treble damage remedy for dumping.62 With such a weapon,
an inefficient domestic firm might well stave off foreign rivals which
could win, but would be intimidated by the prospect of American
litigation.
An aspect of domestic law can be called into play here as well.
55. See Reagan Administration's Package to Congress for Revision of Federal Antitrust
Laws, DER Special Supplement, Feb. 19, 1986, at S9.
56. Baldridge, Rxfor Export Woes: Antitrust Relief, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1985, at 28,
col. 6.
57. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
58. See R. Davis, Antitrust, The Trade Deficit and U.S. International Competitiveness:
A Time for Rethinking, 18 N.Y.U. J. INft'L L. & POL. 1235 (1986).
59. The FTC has set a good example in GM-Toyota, 103 FrC 386 (1984). See generally
R. Pitofsky, A FrameworkforAntitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEo. L.J. 1605 (1986).
60. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
61. Rule, supra note 49, at 12-13.
62. Id.
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Antitrust law prohibits sales below average variable cost as unlaw-
ful predation. 63 The antidumping law goes farther. It finds dump-
ing to exist unless the foreign price exceeds total cost plus 8%. 4
Thus domestic buyers are deprived of lower prices from firms which
could and would price with reference to marginal costs simply for
competitive reasons without anticipating predatory results.
While calculating costs is difficult when the data is relatively
easy to discover, it is far more difficult for goods produced abroad.
One accepted surrogate for cost data is home country pricing.
About three quarters of U.S. dumping cases are brought against
firms which sell in the United States at prices lower than their
prices at home.65 Home country pricing may reflect non-predatory
factors. Distribution costs at home may be higher. This may well
be true of many Japanese consumer items, for example. Cartel or
oligopoly pricing may account for the home prices; there is little
reason to insist that U.S. consumers participate in the same mark-
up. When foreign components are used in U.S. products, the an-
tidumping law may, through its required higher pricing, make the
American end product uncompetitive in the world market.66
Another difficult problem concerns direct foreign subsidy of
exports to the United States. While American consumers benefit
from the lower price, there is strong public sentiment for protecting
the domestic industry from such "unfair competition."6 7 Surpris-
ingly, there is less vocal support for accepting the lower pricesl Ide-
ally, state subsidies will, over time, be removed politically. In the
meantime, a political response protecting American industry is to
be expected despite the fact that it makes little sense either economi-
cally or politically. Protectionism breeds counter-protectionism.
Fortunately there is a current wave of world reform directed at its
limitation. 6
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,69
the Supreme Court rejected a claim of private damage resulting
from Japanese price fixing. It theorized that if the Japanese were in
fact engaged in cartel pricing in the United States, the higher prices
would provide the plaintiffs either greater profits or larger market
63. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(However, prices below average costs are legal if they are reasonable, such as "if a monopolist
was merely liquidating excess, perishable, or obsolete merchandise." Id. at 996).
64. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(b)(e)(1)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1989).
65. Rule, supra note 49, at 10-11.
66. See id. at 11-14.
67. Fong & Walker, supra note 41, at 77.
68. Oddi, supra note 15, at 833.
69. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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share, perhaps both. The coupled predation claim was dismissed
because the lack of success in driving the U.S firms out of business
made predation seem an improbable explanation of what had tran-
spired. While the American firms kept their market shares, Japa-
nese subsidy of products destined for the U.S. could only benefit
consumers through their lower price. Unless the Japanese firms
could recoup their losses by higher monopoly prices, they should
have no motivation to set a lower-than-market price.
There are, of course, other national interests. The United
States may wish to preserve a strong domestic position in such in-
dustries as aviation and electronics because of military considera-
tions. It may wish to reduce business turn over in some fields
because of labor displacement concerns. It may have concern about
the political power of large corporations. Such considerations are
perfectly appropriate, but not well fitted to antitrust.70
One specific field in which protection of domestic manufacture
may be lacking is in the protection of product innovation. Intellec-
tual property law has been slow to adapt to changes in industrial
needs. While intellectual property law protection is the inverse of
allowing the free market to operate, there is general recognition of a
need for protection. Perhaps some modification of that law might
result in a more equitable adjustment to the need to encourage
American innovation.
Of the forms of protection of intellectual property, three major
ones require legislative establishment: patent,71 copyright 72 and
trademark. 3 Patents are issued expressly for innovation. If one
were able to obtain the statutory seventeen years of exclusivity, for
most inventions, that would probably provide a sufficiently substan-
tial reward for their creation. That patent law has not functioned in
that manner, especially in high technology development, is attested
to by the prevalent use of trade secrecy as an alternative. It is esti-
mated that an inventor gets on average six months of advantage
before competitive products challenge its position.74 Among the
problems presented by patent law are: the lack of protection during
the period of patent processing, the need to disclose know-how in
70. See generally F_ BoRK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOX (1978) (Former Judge Bork
argues that judges should interpret the antitrust laws to promote economic efficiency).
71. Weisen, The Elements of a Domestic License of Intellectual Property, 9 ALI-ADA
Course Materials J. 55 (August 1984).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Thornburgh, US. Firms Get Tripped in Race to the Market-place.: Grant Antitrust
Exemptions..., Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1988, at A10, col. 3.
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the patent application which provides information to competitors
and the uncertainty concerning patentability of some forms of inno-
vation. In an era of an explosion of biological discovery, patent
law's uncertainty about protection is lamentable. 7  Design protec-
tion, expressly offered by design patent law, is difficult to obtain in
practice. 6
Copyright law seems also to lag behind industrial needs. Since
it only bars copying and does not inhibit independent development
of identical products, 77 it seems well suited to protection for intel-
lectual property. While its use to protect literature seems quite per-
fected, it has not been adequate in keeping up with technical
changes. Computers are a good illustration. It took a specific new
act, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,11 to provide
protection to that form of electronic expression. To what extent
computer programs are copyrightable is still in controversy. The
field is rapidly developing and uncertainty may well slow progress
considerably.7 9 Even when the law is clearer, copying may prove
difficult to establish in practice.
Trademarks are designed to help identify products with their
producers for consumers.8 They have also become embroiled in
international trade issues in many ways. One particularly signifi-
cant manner in which trademarks have been used involves them in
effective world market division. Since, as a general matter, trade-
mark owners can license exclusive territories for their use, some
have used that power to block the importation of goods sold abroad
into the United States. The control of so called "gray market"
goods, can significantly impede competition by preserving a high
75. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Respondent filed a patent appli-
cation relating to his invention of a human-made, genetically engineered bacterium capable of
breaking down crude oil, a property possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria.
76. Comment, The Future of Design Protection in the United States: An Analysis of the
Proposed Domestic System in View of Recent Developments in the United Kingdom, New Zea-
land, and Australia, 20 J. MAR. L. REv. 261, 261-62 (1986).
77. G. ALEXANDER, COMMERCIAL ToRmS § 3.6 (2d ed. 1988).
78. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-904. This Act generally provides protection for a "mask work"
fixed in a semiconductor chip. Id. § 902(a)(2). A "mask work" is:
a series of related images, however fixed or encoded -
(A) having or representing the predetermined, three-dimensional pattern of
metallic, insulating, or semiconductor material present or removed from
the layers of a semiconductor chip product; and
(B) in which series the relation of the images to one another is that each
images has the pattern of the surface of one form of the semiconductor
chip product.
Id. § 901(a)(2).
79. ALEXANDER, supra note 76, § 8.1.
80. Id. § 1.1.
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market price in one market from the competition of identical (or at
least quite similar) goods."' Similar exclusion may be accomplished
if a United States company alleges that a proposed import would
violate its intellectual property rights."2 Since the filing of a claim
requires the International Trade Commission to block imports until
the matter is resolved, it is another potential barrier to competition
for goods that truly do not violate U.S. rights. The Justice Depart-
ment has indicated a reluctance to prosecute any but the most cal-
culating instances of such conduct.83
Other ideas have no protection at all.84 There is no statute
(and perhaps no common law either) protecting the discovery of
body cells which fight cancer.85 A commercially useful idea which
does not fall into an established parameter of protection may well
be unsalable because an idea becomes unprotectible when it is
disclosed.86
Antitrust also is not fine tuned to intellectual property con-
cerns. Many forms of transactions, for example intellectual prop-
erty licensing agreements, have previously been dealt with under
per se rules apparently in the belief that holding a patent or copy-
right creates market power. 87 The Reagan administration at-
tempted to reverse this result by converting all licensing agreements
to rule of reason analysis and reducing potential damages from treb-
led to singular.88 Even assuming the administration's basic argu-
ment that licensing agreements may result in efficiencies, there is no
reason to resist recognizing that they may also involve horizontal
market division or other conduct which is deservingly condemned
by per se rules. It has been argued that innovation, in general, is so
dispersed that no concern about cartel forming is warranted.8 9
Should that thesis prove correct, it might lead to broad permissive-
ness in new protective legislation of the sort which protects cooper-
81. Id. § 2.4.
82. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982).
83. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 48, at S31. (action permissible on "merely... some
doubt"). Id. at S32.
84. ALEXANDER, supra note 76, § 3.6.
85. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 202 Cal. App. 3d. 1230, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494
(1988).
86. ALEXANDER, supra note 76, § 3.6.
87. Joelson, Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 479,
487 (1984).
88. See Intellectual Property Licensing Legislation; testimony of Charles F. Rule before
the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law and Antitrust, Monopolies and Business
Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, Oct. 20, 1987.
89. Jorde & Treece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust Striking the Right Balance,
4 HIm TECH. L.J. 1 (1989).
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ative research.' There is no apparent reason for extending such
legislation to include general manufacturing.
Using antitrust immunity to promote innovation is, in any
event, unfocused. There are many more direct methods of encour-
aging creativity. Tax policy might be shaped to treat intellectual
property so as to encourage innovation. As an early goal, making
shareholders less interested in immediate profits as opposed to long
term growth might be considered. Governmental purchasing power
might be slanted in the direction of innovative producers. Military
spending already supports many forms of intellectual property.
Creative solutions to other governmental problems might be simi-
larly directly rewarded. The government might provide more seed
financing for appropriate work. Federal recognition, quite aside
from compensation, might provide stimulus. Some of these solu-
tions might directly support intellectual property development
without simultaneously lowering the competitive forces that force
more slothful companies to change.
Perhaps the time has come to develop a more coherent body of
law protecting intellectual property. It will not be an easy matter.
Whatever develops will reduce "competition" to the extent of pro-
tection. Perhaps done well enough, such law could provide suffi-
cient incentive to improve the level of innovation in the country.
Many of the industries that were most concentrated have pro-
duced the least innovation. The auto market is a good illustration.
Steel is another. It seems that the recent explosion in communica-
tions awaited the dismemberment of the telephone company. On
the other hand, the inventions from garage shops are legend in
Silicon Valley.9"
In any event, no universally applicable antitrust dilution seems
adequately thoughtful. There is a difference between direct protec-
tion of intellectual property and the types of antitrust limitations
presently under consideration. Protections would be directly re-
sponsive to innovation. Antitrust limitations run the risk of simply
allowing greater aggregations of power. In the past, large size has
not guaranteed product innovation. Perhaps the converse is true.
90. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988).
91. Case, Sources of Innovation: A Fresh Perspective on the Role of Big Companies and
Small, INC., June 1989, at 29.
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